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Abstract 
 
 The term value is a psychological construct frequently used in the social sciences.  
This research addresses the issue of stability of ratings of perceived value of participants 
for monetary, tangible, and intangible items that cross contexts.  Also elucidated is the 
relationship of value to regret.  Hypothesis one stated that value would be stable across 
time and different rating conditions.  Forty-four participants rated the value of 72 
stimulus items at two time points and in different contexts.  Paired samples t-tests 
indicated 28 participants had no statistical difference in scores.  Twenty-eight scores out 
of 44, when applied to a binomial test, indicates a more than chance proportion of 
significant scores.  The second hypothesis investigated if a difference in stability existed 
in monetary, tangible item, and intangible item domains.  Paired samples t-tests of 
difference scores for all domains of stimulus items grouped by stimulus item category 
revealed that all three pair-wise comparisons showed statistical differences.   The third 
hypothesis stated there was a clear and predictable relationship in the ratings of value and 
regret in a blind choice condition.  After rating value and regret in a choice condition for 
hypothesis three, a statistically significant proportion of the participants fell within the 
hypothesized relationship between value and regret.  This suggests that the construct of 
value has strong, stable, and predictable elements.  These results encourage additional 
research into the nature of value, and its relationship to regret, to form a more 
comprehensive future definition that will benefit multiple fields of study. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
As an underlying principle in many of the social sciences, the psychological 
construct of value serves an important purpose.  Whether the decision making scenario is 
medical and health related, monetary in nature, related to principles of behavior and 
relations to others, or a comparative for cultural reference, the idea of value, or a 
collection of values, acts as a guide to action. 
In economics, value serves as a critical component of research in such areas as 
economic preferences and attitude expression (Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999).  
This research attempts to clarify how individuals view their economic choices and what 
factors mediate purchasing options.  A strong emphasis in this field is on perception and 
the factors that may alter perceptions of value relative to concrete pricing of items in the 
marketplace (Deppe, Schwindt, Kugel, Plabmann, & Kenning, 2005; Zeithaml, 1988). 
The field of philosophy makes use of the construct of value in many ways.   An 
important area for value is that of moral cognition where the neural mechanisms and 
justification for moral decision making within and across various theories of morality 
(Casebeer & Churchland, 2003) are explored.  Another philosophical perspective is that 
of value systems, or collections of individual value judgments that, when combined 
within an individual and society, create a system of behavior and acceptance (Fehr & 
Camerer, 2007; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, 1993) 
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Motivation research has made use of the psychological construct of value over 
many years.  Atkinson (1957) recognized the impact of what an individual values on risk-
taking behavior.  Sorensen (1976) identified value as a specific type of reinforcement to 
encourage specific repeat behaviors in children.  From a behaviorist perspective, this 
finding had great utility in explaining repeated behaviors.  More recently, Expectancy 
Value Theory has incorporated value as an integral mediating component for the 
selection of one decision path over another and has a large body of experimental data for 
review (Bong, 2001; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Wigfield & 
Eccles, 2000). 
In the areas of cognition and perception, value is a critical component.  From a 
perception perspective, value has been viewed as an organization principle for incoming 
stimuli from the environment (Bruner & Goodman, 1947) as well as a filter for those 
perceptions (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004).  An associated area is that of implicit attitude 
formation and those unconscious processes that affect our implicit memory systems and 
therefore the interpretation of our perceptions (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gutig, 
2001; Roskos-Ewoldson & Fazio, 1992).  Another common cognition area in which value 
is prominent is that of memory.  A common question in the area involves emotional 
memories, both implicit and explicit, and whether the concept of value hinders or assists 
the memory consolidation process (Brod, Werkel-Berger, & Shing, 2013; Gottfried, 
O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Mather & Knight, 2005). 
 The construct of value is also an integral element in the judgment and decision 
making literature.  From the cognitive moderation of decision making (McClure, 
Laibson, Lowenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Weber & Johnson, 2009) to hedonic impacts on 
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the decision process (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Higgins, 2000), value is ever 
present.  Tied very closely to the fields of cognition and perception, the decision making 
research often deals with choice conditions and the impacts of value creation from 
previous experience on those decision processes (Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; 
McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling & Slovic, 2006; Storbeck & 
Clore, 2008) 
Though extensive research has been conducted in these fields of study, a common 
understanding of value, its properties and relationships, has yet to emerge as many 
conceptions of value are used.  Examples include perceived value (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 
1993), intrinsic value (Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2005; Beardsley, 2005), task 
value (Bong, 2001; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Fredricks & Eccles, 2002), instrumental 
value (Husman, Derryberry, Crowson, & Lomax, 2004), incentive value (Atkinson, 1957; 
Condly, Clark, & Stolovich, 2003), and attainment value (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Shah 
& Higgins, 1997; Sorenson, 1976).  What has clearly emerged is that the concept of 
value, whether perceived or intrinsic, estimated or final, is used in areas of economic 
research using monetary stimuli (Brandstatter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Desmeules, 
Bechara, & Dube, 2008; Just & Peterson, 2010; Weber & Johnson, 2009), in decision 
making with concrete, tangible, objects (Hastie, 2001; Wedell, 1998), and in perception, 
judgment, and choice conditions using intangible experiences and expressions (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005; Roese, Epstude, & Fessel, 2009; Rokeach, 1973). Different 
definitions and approaches to value within and across fields and research projects, 
however, does not always elucidate the issue:  they can also confound.  
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  One way to provide clarity to the understanding of value is to examine stability of 
perceived value across time and situations of application.  Stability is the recognition that 
affective valuations of stimuli are learned and are often assimilated implicitly (Murray, 
Izquierdo, & Malkova, 2009; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Scherer & Ellsworth, 2009; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2008; Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2009).  To understand the role affect 
may play in the memory of experienced stimuli, and, hence, stability, one must turn to the 
biology of the organism. Whether discussing affective style (Davidson, 2004), neural 
decision theory (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008), an affect oriented event-coding 
account of action (Lavender & Hommel, 2007), appraisal theories of affect and cognition 
(Scherer & Ellsworth, 2009) or the primacy of feelings in judgment (Pham, Cohen, 
Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001), one element is quite clear:  there is a specific neural link 
between affective stimuli as registered in the amygdala and a positive impact on memory 
retention.  The amygdala does not act alone in the enhancement of memory, but is shown 
to marshall cortical areas of the prefrontal cortex related to attention to promote 
continued focus on the stimuli in question, and to stimulate hippocampal regions for the 
actual encoding of the memory for later retrieval (Davidson, 2004; Isen, 2008; Kensinger 
& Schacter, 2008; LaBar, 2009; Sander, 2009). 
 Therefore, the concept of stability with value represents an affective memory 
trace for a particular stimulus that will cause an organism, barring cognitive or affective 
interference, to remember the felt expression of the stimulus and to regard it similarly 
through multiple experiences.  This allows for both stability and growth as the memory 
trace will be used as a reference for future judgments while the memory trace is also open 
to modification through synaptic plasticity from new experiences. 
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Regret is a construct directly related to decision making.   Value, as stated, has 
had a great deal of research conducted in the area of decision making.  To consider that 
they may have a relation to one another is worthy of investigation.  When an individual 
makes a decision, he or she may have particular emotions and expectations associated 
with the type of decision to be made (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002).  Regret is directly 
tied to the expectations of the decision.  More specifically, regret is the cognitively based 
negative emotion associated with a decision of poor outcome that an individual believes 
might have turned out differently with a different choice made (Gilbert, Morewedge, 
Risen, & Wilson, 2004).  The cognitive creation of multiple alternatives in a decision 
situation and the attempted evaluation of those alternative has been termed counterfactual 
thinking – first identified by Kahneman and Tversky in 1982 (Hetts, Boninger, Armor, 
Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000). Counterfactuals contain all the elements necessary to 
identify and research the overall decision process, including the motivation to act 
according to what an individual most desires or values.  Counterfactuals contain 
antecedent conditions and multiple alternative outcomes that can give rise to the 
cognitive processes necessary to reach each of the alternative goal states and therefore 
give rise to the behavioral process that is actually used to reach an identified goal state 
(Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000). 
The quality of stability as a function of value may prove to be an important 
definitional characteristic.  The construct of regret, and any relationship to value 
observed, may assist to illuminate the psychological construct of value through 
experimental methods. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 The psychological construct of value has been the subject of research in many 
fields of study.  Despite the extensive research base, it is still not a coherent construct.  
Some understanding of how the construct of value functions within and across the 
domains of monetary, tangible, and intangible items is necessary if value is to become a 
cohesive construct.  Additionally, to date, research has not yet demonstrated whether 
value judgments an individual makes are stable across time.  The stability of a construct 
directly relates to its reliability in classical research terms.  Reliability, in simple terms, is 
the ability to receive similar scores from a measure of a construct in different times and 
circumstances, assuming nothing has changed to alter the individual or the measure 
between measurements (Golafshani, 2003; Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008; Roberts, 
Priest, & Traynor, 2006).  Though reliability is required for there to be validity in a 
construct, it is not enough on its own to warrant claiming validity (Roberts, Priest, & 
Traynor, 2006; Trochim, 2006). 
Do those value judgments, or perceived value of items and situation ratings, in 
one instance carry over when an individual is faced with a choice condition?   As 
decision making and value is important in economic (Deppe, Schwindt, Kugel, 
Plabmann, & Kenning, 2005; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999; Zeithaml, 1988) as 
well as non-economic (McClure, Laibson, Lowenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Weber & 
Johnson, 2009) research areas, the idea that a person’s decision processes over time 
would be stable relative to the value judgments made in the decision process does much 
for the prediction of human behavior should an individual’s value judgments be made 
explicit. 
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Additionally, the construct validity of value can only be enhanced if a solid, 
stable, and predictable relationship exists between the construct of value and another 
heavily researched construct such as regret (King & Hicks, 1990; Trochim, 2006; Westen 
& Rosenthal, 2003). 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to address the issue of perceived value of an 
individual for items from multiple domains of interest:  specifically the monetary, 
tangible, and intangible domains previously identified.  Are perceived values for items 
stable across time and contexts, or will those ratings easily change in the presence of 
other items of interest from multiple categories?  Additionally, this study will elucidate 
the relationship of value to regret which is a very thoroughly studied construct with 
experimental evidence across multiple fields such as personal relationships (Roese, 
Epstude, & Fessel, 2009; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Bruegelmans, & Pieters, 2008), 
economics (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011; Thiene, Boeri, Chorus, 2012), and 
general decision making (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Summerville, 2011). 
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
 Three questions, and three accompanying hypotheses, drive this endeavor.   
1. Does the psychological construct of value have stability across time and context 
of experience within an individual?   
Hypothesis: The first hypothesis is simply that the psychological construct of 
value is a relatively stable construct that should resist moderation over short 
periods of time and across contexts of use and consideration. This hypothesis 
follows the tenets of implicit memory in that repeated exposures to a particular 
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stimulus, particularly affective exposure (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Davidson, 
2004; Payne, Jackson, Ryan, Hoscheidt, Jacobs, & Nadel, 2006), will enhance the 
longevity of the memory and allow for similar physiological responses, otherwise 
known as feelings, with continued exposures (Alberini, 2011; Betsch, Plessner, 
Schwieren, & Gutig, 2001; Brod, Werkle-Bergner, & Shing, 2013; Mace, 2005).  	
2. Do the broad domains of value as categorized by monetary, tangible, and 
intangible stimuli differ in their levels of stability? 
Hypothesis: It is an open question whether the three domains of monetary items, 
tangible items and intangible items will differ in how stable they are.  A great deal 
of experimental work on value has been done using money as a stimulus in 
economic preferences (Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999), consumer 
perceptions (Zeithaml, 1988) and in the categorization of immediate and delayed 
reward (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004).  Additionally, the role 
and value of life domains (George & Jones, 1996; Roese, 2005), collections of 
values and value systems (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) and the effect 
of regret and disappointment on item valuations (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & 
Rijsman, 2011) has been reviewed. To date, research has not examined the three 
domains of tangible items, intangible items and monetary items within the same 
investigation.  This question, therefore, is highly exploratory in nature and is 
designed to delineate possible relationships.	
3. Is there an identifiable relationship between the well-studied construct of regret 
and the construct of value? 
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Hypothesis:  Hypothesis three states that there is a clear and predictable 
relationship between value and regret.  More specifically, the hypothesis states 
that when an individual is faced with a blind choice condition between two 
objects and/or experiences, and the perceived value of one of those items and/or 
experiences is higher than the other, then the regret for choosing the more valued 
item and/or experience over the less valued item and/or experience will be low.  
Similarly, if the individual in the blind choice condition chooses the lesser valued 
item and/or experience instead of the more valued item and/or experience, the 
perceived regret for that blind choice will be high.  This hypothesis is believed to 
be accurate because of two conditions:  first, the nature of the decision making 
process under uncertainty and its relation to the value and regret relationship, and 
second, the personal agency exhibited by the decision-maker.  Hastie (2001) 
describes research in the judgment and decision making arena as, “…how people 
(and other organisms and machines) combine desires (utilities, personal values, 
goals, ends, etc.) and beliefs (expectations, knowledge, means, etc.) to choose a 
course of action” (p. 655).  Using the stability component of value from 
hypothesis one, and the comment from Hastie (2001), the individual facing a 
choice condition will attempt to make a decision that will optimize the outcome to 
meet the individual’s desires and beliefs.  This decision process, when successful, 
will provide a positive affective response that will be remembered and used again 
when faced with a similar choice condition in the future.  Likewise, should the 
individual facing a choice condition make a decision that leads away from his or 
her desires and beliefs, there will be a negative affective response that will affect 
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future, similar, decisions.  A key component found to be essential in the 
expression of regret is that of personal agency and the sense that the individual 
had control over the situation and made a bad choice (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, 
Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000).  Regret, therefore, is accompanied by feelings 
that the individual has lost an opportunity and desire to correct one’s mistake, by 
wanting to completely undo the situation, and a wish that the situation could be 
“done over” to produce a more valued outcome (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005).  
This is one of the most consistently found results in regret research and has been 
found in a variety of experimental contexts (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & 
Wilson, 2004; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  
Therefore, in a choice condition, the judgment of value between what was 
selected, as opposed to what could have been selected, will form a regret variable 
that should follow a specific pattern based on the perceived, personal, value of the 
stimulus items in the choice condition.	
Operational Definitions 
To create a more empirically focused definition of value, operational definitions 
of the three primary constructs of the study are presented.  As a construct, value will be 
assessed by a participant who will view a stimulus item and rate how important that item 
would be for the person to personally and individually have.  The rating will be on a scale 
of 1 to 10 with 1 being not important and 10 being very important.  The stimulus items 
will be grouped into the three domains of items and/or experiences previously identified 
as monetary, tangible, and intangible domains. 
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Stability as a construct will be assessed through the value ratings.  The participant 
will make value ratings for the same stimulus items at two different times and under two 
different conditions. Statistical comparisons will then be made to judge the similarity in 
ratings between the two times and contexts. 
The emotional response of regret can only be present when personal choice and 
multiple alternatives are present (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007; van Dijk, van der Plight, 
Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998).  Therefore, the construct of regret will be 
assessed in a choice condition after a participant has blindly selected one stimulus item, 
rated it on the value scale, viewed the unselected stimulus item, and rated it on the value 
scale.  Once the ratings of value have been made the participant will rate the regret of 
having selected one stimulus item over another on a 10 point scale with 1 being low 
regret and 10 being high regret. 
Significance 
 This research is a first step in exploring a very important construct, value, across 
different domains of interest.  With additional research outside of any one discipline, but 
bridging multiple fields, it may be possible to have the experimental contributions of 
value from the field of motivation (Bong, 2001; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Sorenson, 1976) 
to be meaningful and assist in experimental efforts in other disciplines using value such 
as economics (Depp, Schwindt, Kugel, Plabmann, & Kenning, 2005; van’t Wout, Kahn, 
Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006; ) and decision making (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008; 
Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  It may also be possible 
to use the information from this study to begin the process of building a definition, tied to 
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experimental results and to an already strongly studied construct, that will bridge multiple 
disciplines and aid all fields that adopt its use. 
 As regret is already a construct with a strong experimental background in multiple 
fields such as personal relationships (Roese, Epstude, & Fessel, 2009; Zeelenberg & 
Bruegelmans, 2008), economics (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011; Thiene, Boeri, 
Chorus, 2012), and general decision making (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Summerville, 2011), confirming a specific relationship between value and regret can only 
improve the validity of both.  Construct validity cannot be established without both 
content and convergent validity (Trochim, 2006). 
Any explication of the qualities of the construct of value, such as the stability of 
value, will enhance content validity (Beckstead, 2009; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Rubio, 
Berg-Weger, Tebb, Lee, & Rauch, 2003) while investigations into the relationship 
between value and a well and widely studied construct such as regret can only serve to 
assist development of convergent validity (King & Hicks, 1990; Trochim, 2006; Westen 
& Rosenthal, 2003). 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
 One underlying concept at the root of any decision process is that of value 
(Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; De Dreu & Boles, 1998; Delgado & Dilmore, 2008; 
Deppe, Schwindt, Kugel, Pabmann, & Kenning, 2006; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006; Rangel, 2008).  The purpose 
behind studying decision making, motivation, judgment, emotion, and other 
psychological entities of utilitarian perspective is ostensibly to better understand human 
behavior; as life can be viewed as an endless string of choices and decisions that can 
dramatically affect an individual at the time of their determination as well as in the future 
(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Schwartz, 1996).  All of these questions affect more than 
the individual making the decision and impact such broad ranging topics as politics, 
ethics, and economics (Sanfey, 2007).  Therefore, value, as a psychological construct, is a 
critical element in understanding human behavior. 
 By understanding behavior, it may even be possible to predict the course of action 
an individual will select under particular conditions.  The greatest difficulty in attempting 
to predict decision making behavior is to categorize all of the relevant variables that an 
individual may use in any choice or decision process.  Without identifying the elements 
of the decision process, how can any models be created that adequately predict the 
process? 
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 Though value, as a construct, has been studied in psychology (Higginson, 
Mansell, & Wood, 2011; Marken & Mansell, 2013), philosophy (Phinney, Ong, & 
Madden, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), and economics 
(Rustichini, 2005; Sanfey, Lowenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006) and therefore provides 
for a wealth of background literature, the same provides for a great deal of uncertainty.  A 
review of the psychological construct of value is, therefore, required to identify potential 
common elements and properties that would prove beneficial to empirical efforts with the 
construct. 
  Although individuals commonly make decisions in uncertain conditions, it is not 
surprising that one emotion of particular interest is regret.  When an individual makes a 
decision, he or she may have particular emotions associated with the type of decision to 
be made (getting married, buying a house, selecting a retirement savings plan, etc.) and 
form expectations as to the outcome, and the emotions associated with the outcome, of 
the decision process (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002).  Regret is directly tied to the 
expectations of an individual’s decision outcome.  More specifically, regret is the 
cognitively based negative emotion associated with a decision of poor outcome that 
might have turned out differently with a different choice made (Gilbert, Morewedge, 
Risen, & Wilson, 2004). 
 As both value and regret are constructs strongly related to the decision making 
process, it is natural to question what relationship might exist between the two constructs.  
The more information known about how the two may work together in a decision 
process, the more solid the empirical data related to the important subject of decision 
making. 
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Value  
As a construct used in multiple fields of study, value can be complicated to study 
and understand as the definitions often change from field to field.  To create some sense 
of order from the multiple definitions and usages, a review of the construct of value as 
used in the fields of philosophy, motivation, cognition, and economics is provided. 
Philosophy.  In the philosophy literature, value traditionally makes an appearance 
in one of four ways:  intrinsic value, or the value inherent in an item or belief (Beardsley, 
2005; Feldman, 2005; Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2005; Rokeach, 1973); 
instrumental or final value which places the importance not on the object itself, but as an 
end state or relation between itself and another item (Feldman, 2005; Rabinowicz & 
Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2005); value as a belief that a person holds which may direct an 
individual’s actions (Beardsley, 2005; Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2005; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001); and value as a collection of individual beliefs 
that helps to create a defining characteristic or personality for an individual (Rabinowicz 
& Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2005; Rokeach, 1973).  Though these different conceptions of 
value are all somewhat related, they each have different definitions based on the state of 
intangible being, tangible or monetary object, personal preference, or individual being 
ascribed the condition of value.  
Unfortunately, though Rokeach and others wished to create a foundation upon 
which empirical studies could be produced and shared for common understanding, the 
conceptions of value proposed largely have no grounding or foundation beyond that of 
observation and logic.  Does this completely invalidate these conceptions?  No, it does 
not.  However, a researcher, following these descriptions and definitions would have no 
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idea of how an individual creates these preferences or why an individual would view an 
object as having value.  The assumption is simply that people do create preferences and 
objects do have value in the eye of the beholder.  The question of “how” is missing.  This 
leaves the current conceptions without an empirical foundation.  That is not to say, 
however, that empirical efforts may not include, and therefore elucidate, Rokeach’s 
conceptions of value. 
Some empirical efforts in the philosophical arena have been made in regards to 
value singularly, and values, or value systems, as collections of intangible individual 
values that form guiding principles for motivational goals (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  
Quite often, the empirical research in this realm involves either individual relationships 
(Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee, 1999; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) or 
cross cultural comparisons (Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; 
Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).  Though not always listed as philosophy specifically, the 
research listed uses the philosophical resources for the conceptions and definitions that 
form the structure of the studies. 
Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee (1999) performed three experiments to determine how 
culture might affect the values an individual relates as an individual, versus the values an 
individual may relate as a member of a specific culture.  Individualistic intangible values 
consisted of freedom, independence, living an exciting life, choosing one’s course in life, 
and others as examples.  More collectivist value judgment examples were belongingness, 
friendship, family safety, national security, etc.  These individualistic and collectivist 
values were rated on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being not at all important and 7 being of 
extreme importance.  Through priming of individualist or collectivist social judgment 
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through both stories and word searches, a values inventory rating 56 values as to how 
important a particular value might be as a guiding principle for behavior and obligation, 
and the Twenty Statements Task (TST) by Kuhn and McPartland (1954), the researchers 
determined that culture and priming both impact how an individual perceives his or her 
value judgments in relation to goals and behaviors.  This implies that value systems are 
relatively flexible under priming conditions. 
Another individualistic perspective can be found in the research by Stern, Dietz, 
and Kalof (1993).  This research used a regression model with special weighting for the 
belief that an individual will be predisposed to take action when an adverse consequence 
is present for something he or she values:  more specifically, if adverse consequences to 
the environment are likely, and those consequences will affect the individual, the 
individual is likely to act if the environment is valued.  The researchers measured the 
beliefs about consequences for self, specific gender, others, and the environment through 
survey questions and intentional statements.  These variables, used as weights in the 
regression analysis, point to a system of varied value levels for individuals in regards to 
the environment and intention to act toward valued goals. 
From a group and value systems perspective, Schwartz and Bardi (2001) used 10 
previously identified types of values and their importance ratings to identify similarities 
in values held between different cultures.  The central element of identification for the 10 
values was their motivationally expressed goal.  The survey asked participants to rate the 
importance of various tangible and intangible items such as occupational choice, 
consumer purchases, and religiosity.  Participants from 56 nations, a teacher contingent 
and representative contingent from each nation, rated the importance of the values.  
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Hierarchies of values were then calculated per nation.  Means of the ratings and their 
ranks then allowed for correlations to be run between samples and nations.  Calculated 
Pearson correlations between teacher samples and the 56 represented nations indicated a 
high degree of similarity and stability.  The non-teacher samples across the same 56 
represented nations also yielded Pearson correlations that indicated a degree of similarity 
and stability. 
Motivation.  In a similar manner to the field of philosophy, the area of motivation 
within the realm of psychology tends to focus on the ideas of incentive value, attainment 
value, intrinsic value, and reward.  The majority of this work builds off of the early 
motivation work of Atkinson (1957) who suggested the importance of value in his 
research on risk-taking behavior.  For Atkinson (1957), a major question for motivation 
was simply how to account for an individual’s selection of one path or action over 
another.  To answer that question, Atkinson stated that three variables must be defined:  
motive, expectancy, and incentive.  Expectancy was defined as a cognitive anticipation of 
an outcome based upon cues provided by the situation. Motive, however, was not nearly 
so easily stated. Essentially, motive, by Atkinson’s perspective, was a relatively stable 
internal drive to meet a particular goal or state.  Incentive was the third in the triumvirate 
and of special interest. 
When discussing this particular variable, Atkinson (1957) acknowledged that, 
“The incentive [value] variable has been relatively ignored, or at best crudely defined, in 
most research.”  The definition that he provides for the variable states simply that, “It 
represents the relative attractiveness of a specific goal that is offered in a situation, or the 
relative unattractiveness of an event that might occur as a consequence of some act” 
	
	
19 
(Atkinson, 1957).  Working together, the motive provided a drive for a particular goal, 
tangible or intangible, specified as incentive value.  The expectation was the cognitive 
anticipation of the desired, or valued, outcome based on past experiences. This early 
work on a theory of expectancy, value, and motive led to expansions upon the idea which 
continue to include the construct of value, but often in different, or multiple, conceptions.   
Rosenberg (1960) developed an early theory of attitude dynamics that involved a 
cognitive and affective component of any valuation of tangible or intangible 
circumstance.  The evaluative nature of the cognitive and affective component, and the 
expected positive or negative outcome of any venture, was expected to be a motivating 
factor in behavior (Cohen, Fishbein, & Ahtola, 1972).  Rosenberg’s early experiments 
included variations of tests of cognitive structures and ratings, or value judgments, 
regarding objects and events at intervals of 30 days.  His results indicated that when 
affective and cognitive components of an attitude are consistent, attitudinal judgments are 
stable.  Similarly, if the cognitive and affective components are not consistent, the 
attitudinal state is unstable.  This instability required the individual to go through a 
reorganization of cognitive and affective state to again reach equilibrium and stability 
(Rosenberg, 1960). 
Another extension of this can be found in the expectancy-value components of 
attitude as expressed by Fishbein (1963).  In this conception, a person’s attitude toward 
an intangible event or tangible object may be estimated by multiplying the probability of 
an event or goal manifesting and the affective evaluation of the tangible or intangible 
stimulus.  Predictive validity for this model was shown by Palmgreen and Rayburn 
(1982) through an investigation of correlations between respondents’ beliefs and affective 
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attitudes toward news and newsmedia and the goals, rewards, or gratifications for 
engaging with the news. 
A more modern motivational theory expressing value as a component is 
expectancy-value theory (Nagengast, Marsh, & Scalas, 2011; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 
1982; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  Expectancy-value theory is an expansion upon the work 
of Atkinson (1957), Rosenberg (1960), and Battle (1965).  Expectancy-value theory can 
be loosely expressed as the motivational elements involved in both the cognitive 
evaluation an individual makes regarding personal ability to perform a task and how 
much the task is valued (Wigfield, 1994).  Ultimately, an achievement motivation 
perspective such as expectancy-value theory attempts to, “…explain people’s choice of 
achievement tasks, persistence on those tasks, vigor in carrying them out, and 
performance on them.” (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). This was accurately portrayed in 
Feather and O’Brien’s (1987) work with unemployed individuals.  Feather and O’Brien 
found strong correlation between an individual’s expectation of finding employment and 
the extent to which employment itself was viewed as valuable.  Additionally, Wiklund, 
Davidsson, and Delmar (2003) identified that small business managers’ expectations of 
different hypothetical outcomes regarding business growth were highly correlated to the 
value previous surveys had established for said outcomes.  This analysis was confirmed 
through replicated linear regression analysis (Wiklund, Davidsson, & Delmar, 2003). 
The expectancy component requires two elements.  The first is a self-efficacy 
ability belief judgment related to the task, goal, desire, or value that is presented (Bong, 
2001).  Based on past experience with a similar task, goal, or value, the individual 
determines whether he or she is capable of the process.  Once that cognitive and affective 
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evaluation is completed, an expectation of success or failure is formed (Wigfield & 
Eccles, 2000).  The interaction of the personally variable expectancy component and the 
personally variable value component create the directionality of the effort and persistence 
of the individual to the end state in a particular domain or situation (Eccles & Wigfield, 
2002).  This interaction was tested in a large scale study by Nagengast, et. al. (2011) 
through path analysis and structural equation modeling self-concept, enjoyment of 
science, and science career aspirations and extracurricular activities. For the 398,750 
student participants from 57 countries, the model had a high comparative fit index (.975) 
and accurately predicted career aspirations and extracurricular activities from 
expectancies and values derived for science.  The previous simplistic explanation of the 
complex interaction of cognitive expectancies and affective value can more easily be 
explained and traced through figure 2.1 below. 
 Of particular interest for this research is the value component of the expectancy-
value model.  The overarching value term used in the model is task value and focuses on 
an individual’s incentives, motivations, and reasons for engaging in activities (Mahama, 
Silbereisen, & Eccles, 2013).  The attractiveness of task value stems not from some new 
and unique view of value, but from the fact that task value incorporates a number of 
elements from the Atkinson (1957) model as well as elements that have been derived 
from said model (Bong, 2001; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Fredricks & Eccles, 2002; 
Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  Task value is defined as a combination of attainment value, 
intrinsic value, utility value, and cost (Eccles et al., 1983).  It has been studied 
empirically and confirmatory factor analysis has successfully differentiated the constructs 
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of task value, self-efficacy, and mastery and performance goal orientations (Bong, 2001).  
Combined with the previous list of value types derived from the Atkinson (1957) model, 
an ultimate list of potential value types was established for the expectancy-value model:  
Incentive Value, Attainment Value, Intrinsic Value, Reward, and Cost (Atkinson, 1957; 
Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
Incentive value, as provided by Atkinson (1957) has already been discussed as the 
provision of a positive outcome for engaging in a particular activity or the avoidance of a 
negative outcome by engaging in a particular activity.   The incentive in this respect is 
either adding a positive element to a situation through a choice condition, or the 
avoidance or elimination of a negative element through a particular choice.  This is not 
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dissimilar to the concept of positive and negative reinforcement from a classical 
conditioning perspective (Gredler, 1997).  However, the motivational perspective looks at 
the incentive as a pre-action potential and classical conditioning looks to reinforcement as 
a post action response. 
 Following that line of thought, Heckhausen (1991) views the idea of incentive 
value as less a motivational attribute, and more a reinforcement.  From his perspective, 
actions themselves have no incentive value as the incentive comes from the consequence 
of the action.  As a consequence is a situation that can only occur after an action, 
incentive value was less a motivational construct to perform an initial action and more a 
reinforcement to encourage that action in the future to produce a more stable choice 
behavior. 
 As motivational work continued and the idea of incentive value was modified, 
and or expanded, into other concepts, certain overlaps occurred.  This is particularly the 
case with attainment value as indicated by Folger and Doherty (1993).  Their work 
revolved primarily around the idea of perceived value of monetary sums in the attainment 
of specific goals.  This would initially place their work in the following section related to 
attainment value, however, the energization model presented in their work relies 
significantly upon, “… the perceived value of incentives given for successful task 
completion” (p. 422).  Clearly, the idea of the value of incentives in the motivation to 
complete, or attain, a particular goal or state of being, was a major transitional step from 
the early work of Atkinson (1957). 
 A more clearly defined attainment value was presented by Sorenson (1976).  This 
representation more closely follows the modern definitions of attainment value as 
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stipulated in the over-arching construct of task value (Bong, 2001; Eccles & Wigfield, 
2002).  Sorenson (1976) provides two definitions:  one for relative attainment value and 
one for absolute attainment value.  Relative attainment value is viewed as the importance 
of doing well in a particular area of endeavor compared to other areas while absolute 
attainment value is viewed as the competence one has in a particular area regardless of 
the competence in other areas.  Although these constructs share similar roots, Eccles & 
Wigfield (2002) demonstrated that these constructs are separate.  Researchers asked sixth 
grade children to first rate how important it was to perform a particular task in English, 
mathematics, and sports.  After completing the first set of questions, students had to 
complete a second set that asked how competent they felt in those areas on the same 
scale.  Analysis of findings indicated that relative attainment value is a perceived value of 
self or group whereas absolute attainment value deals with physical capability and 
competence regardless of perceived value by self or others (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 
 Shah and Higgins (1997) further explore the idea of attainment value as, 
“…determined by underlying needs to attain desired end-states” (p. 448).  The example 
given to clarify the construct is that, “the value in attaining food is based on both 
cognitive conceptions of the value of food and one’s underlying hunger” (p. 448).  
Therefore, attainment value, at least in this example, may be viewed as a combination of 
cognitive and affective elements in regards to a particular stimulus.  An individual’s 
reactions to a tangible object or intangible situation will clearly be predicated on the 
cognitive and affective experiences with said object or situation.  Through four different 
experiments utilizing linear regression analysis, Shah and Higgins (1997) found 
significant interactions between regulatory focus, expectancy, and attainment value.  In 
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essence, the directions of the interactions indicate a positive influence on goal attainment 
when the goal is considered an attainment as opposed to an obligation. 
 Still another view of attainment value comes from the expectancy-value models 
of Wigfield and Eccles (2000).  In this model, attainment value takes a somewhat 
different perspective.  Building on the previous work of Battle (1966), Wigfield and 
Eccles (2000) perceive attainment value as the importance of doing well on a particular 
task.  To further this perspective, attainment value is doing well on a task as an element 
of an individual’s self assessment of worth and competence in one’s self-schema (Eccles 
& Wigfield, 2002). 
 The next element of task value is that of intrinsic value.  The basic idea within 
intrinsic value is that of personal interest and enjoyment of an activity as the rationale for 
engaging in said activity (Fredricks & Eccles, 2002).  An elaboration on this basic theme 
comes from Eccles and Wigfield (2002) that includes the subjective interest that an 
individual has for a proposed activity.  Further, there is a belief that an individual who 
engages in an activity for intrinsic purposes will meet, and or satisfy, certain positive 
psychological goals (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
 Utility value is another of the task value subsets.  Wigfield and Eccles (2000) list 
utility value as the usefulness of an activity to reaching a greater goal.  The importance of 
this conception is the fact that an individual may have no interest in a particular activity, 
but will continue to engage in said activity simply because it serves as a means to an end.  
Husman et al. (2004) give a good review of the various conceptions of utility value from 
Raynor’s (1969) view of there being two temporal qualities to the construct, both present 
and future, to Atkinson’s (1957) Expectancy x Value perspective discussed previously.  
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Salience is another term that has been used to describe utility value and has been shown 
to correlate positively with cognitive strategies used to study effectively in academic 
subjects (Pintrich, 1999). 
 Clearly there are different definitions for the various constructs mentioned within 
the realm of motivation.  However, one element is designed to hold them together:  one 
element to create a family of constructs.  That one binding element is value.  Hence, from 
the motivation literature, a clear definition of value is not only desirable, but essential in 
understanding the currently proposed constructs. 
Cognition.  It is also proposed that the psychological construct of value may 
affect how one perceives the world (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004).  Bruner and Goodman (1947) proposed a number of hypotheses though only two 
provide an insight into the idea of value and perception.  The first hypothesis suggested 
that the greater the social value of an object, the greater the impact it would have on 
perception before cognitive appraisal.  The idea behind the hypothesis is that certain 
objects or stimuli become accentuated to our senses based on their proposed and 
individualized value.  This proposal would suggest that the greater the social value, as 
recognized by culture, personal interest, and experience, the more attuned we are to the 
perception of said object or stimuli.  A more modern approach to this issue was taken by 
Pessoa (2008) in discussing valued affective stimuli in the environment and the temporal 
qualities of the perception of affect.  The automatic quality of perception was confirmed 
by Pessoa (2008) and elaborated upon through the biological processes of the medial 
temporal region of the brain, often associated with affect (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & 
Gutig, 2001; Dolan, 2002; LeBar & Cabeza, 2006; Pessoa, 2008).  The processes of 
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perception through any sensory organ are mediated by medial temporal region structures 
that evaluate the relative importance of the stimuli before sending the information to 
more conscious cognitive areas for additional processing.  This unconscious processing 
of perceived elements of the environment supports the first hypothesis of Bruner and 
Goodman (1947) as well as the second: “the greater the individual need for a socially 
valued object, the more marked will be the operation of behavioral determinants” (p. 37).  
Both hypotheses presume that the greater the value of a tangible object or intangible 
stimuli, whether from a personal or social perspective, the greater impact said object or 
stimuli will have on our perception. 
Bruner and Goodman (1947) never give a definition for the construct.  They do 
discuss the various ways in which particular stimuli may become fixated, i.e., the senses 
are conditioned - to have a primacy effect on our processing.  In one example, children 
were asked to estimate the size, from memory, of different denominations of coins.  
Then, the children were asked to estimate the sizes of grey cardboard squares introduced 
earlier.  Even though the grey cardboard circles were the same size as coins, the coins 
were always estimated as larger.  Additional analysis indicated that children from higher 
socio-economic backgrounds had faster and more accurate estimates of coins than 
children from lower socio-economic backgrounds even though their grey cardboard disk 
estimates were similar.  Based on the hypotheses presented, the logical course would 
suggest that the items most likely to become fixated are items more likely to be valued.  
Such items include food, water, love, fame, and money and are considered rewards; a 
very behaviorist motivational perspective.  This gives insight into the authors’ intent 
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regarding what is valued and what is not, but it is far from a definition and presents, 
therefore, a weak theoretical front. 
 Closely following the idea of value as perceptual moderator is the work of Hsee 
and Rottenstreich (2004).  Their work focuses on two types of value, valuation by 
calculation and valuation by feeling, both of which may act in a conscious or unconscious 
manner and can affect behavior.  Though both types of processes of valuation affect 
behavior, neither is clearly defined from the perspective of actual value.  The closest to a 
definition one gets from a highly detailed analysis of preference decision-making is the 
idea that value is equated with satisfaction (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004, p. 23). 
 The work of Bruner and Goodman (1947), Pessoa (2008), Dolan (2002), and Hsee 
and Rottenstreich (2004) in the area of value as perceptual modifier, in turn, could have 
an impact on how an individual might organize in memory, either consciously or not, 
information important to his or her life (Betsch et al., 2001; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006).   
 The entire idea of value affecting, not just how one perceives the world, but also 
how one stores memories of perceptions and builds knowledge structures from 
experiences, has a tremendous impact on how one might view the nature of human 
existence beyond simply human behavior.  And yet, for all of its importance, the field of 
cognition and psychology has both an unstructured and diverse set of possible definitions 
for the psychological construct of value. 
Economics.  The construct of value has a long and solid history in the field of 
economics and economic decision making, or decision making under risk, usually framed 
from the perspective of both normative and descriptive decision making (Gurevich, 
Kliger, & Levy, 2009; Hakimzada, Gutnik, Yoskowitz, & Patel, 2005).  The normative 
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perspective is a more logical expectation of economic behavior that can be 
algorithmically expressed as an axiom:  a should be statement of behavior (Harrison, 
2008).  Descriptive economic decision making recognizes that an individual perhaps 
should follow some rule of behavior, but often does not for some individual or 
personalized reason or rationale.  The heuristic models are most used to represent this 
variability (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  Two specific decision making theories and 
one area of decision making research will be investigated to clarify the role of value in 
economic, and risky, decision making. 
The more descriptive perspective was largely pioneered by Kahneman and 
Tversky with prospect theory (1973, 1983).  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
studied human decision making under uncertainty during the early 1970’s in response to 
variations in responses in expected utility experiments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  
The various studies that they conducted led to an interesting discovery:  humans do not 
make decisions, economic or otherwise, regarding future events in a logical manner as 
postulated by, “the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction” as found in 
expected utility theory (Kahneman, 1973).  From these studies, the two researchers 
determined that, instead of following these mathematical laws, humans rely on certain 
heuristics in order to draw conclusions.  Heuristics are strategies that are highly 
economical in nature and simplify complex tasks to operations more easily dealt with 
(Cosmides, 1996).  This collection of heuristics is called prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1983).  This theory contains two stages:  an editing stage where an individual 
evaluates and simplifies the data involved in the decision, and a valuation stage where an 
individual, based on his or her current status, evaluates the change in value inherent in the 
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decision and whether that change in value would prove beneficial based on one’s current 
status. 
 More specifically, the editing stage involves the coding of information into gains 
and losses compared to an individual’s current status, the simplification of multiple 
probabilities that are similar through combination, the segregation of risky elements of 
the decision from riskless elements that do not require evaluation, and the cancellation of 
shared components in a decision that do not require consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1983).  Additionally, the editing stage contains the simplification process where more 
complex probabilities are rounded to more easily evaluated statements and the scanning 
of information to detect dominated alternatives that can be immediately eliminated from 
the decision process (Khaneman & Tversky, 1992).  All of these processes work to 
reduce the cognitive activity required of an individual during the deliberation process. 
 The valuation stage is dependent upon three elements:  the current status of the 
individual, the change in value of the decision in relation to the status of the individual, 
and how the individual will weigh that value in comparison to other potential outcomes.  
The belief is that the change in value in a decision is only relevant in regard to the 
amount of that change in relation to a person’s current status.  If the change has 
significant meaning to the individual, the prospect is considered in terms of that change, 
and not necessarily the probabilities inherent in that change.  The potential outcomes 
from this valuation are then given different weights based on the desirability of the 
outcome compared to another (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
 More recently, value as a construct in economics has been theorized and studied 
empirically through a neuroscience perspective.  This relatively new field of study, 
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neuroeconomics, attempts to use standard neuroscience techniques such as brain imaging, 
patients with brain damage behavior, animal behavior, and other neural recording efforts 
to understand how economic preference and decision making is manifest in the brain 
(Camerer, Lowenstein, & Prelec, 2004).  Proponents of neuroeconomics point to the 
normative models of behavior that could not adequately predict the various ways in 
which humans would break the logical rules proposed, and the descriptive models that 
attempted to list the various heuristics for human behavior, but were unable to account 
for their origins and variability.  To account for both perspectives, neuroeconomics uses 
the neuroscientific methods to account for the known issues of the past, and hopefully 
propose more accurate theories for the future (Hakimzada, Gutnik, Yoskowitz, & Patel, 
2005; Rustichini, 2005). 
 The construct of value manifests in neuroeconomics often through preferences 
and emotions. As stated by Litt, Eliasmith, and Thagard (2008), “Economists commonly 
take preferences as given, but from a psychological point of view it should be possible to 
explain how preferences arise from cognitive and affective processes” (p. 252).  Previous 
research on preference required the inference of preference through questionnaires and 
purchasing behavior, as it could not be accurately represented.  Now, however, 
preferences can be traced through various cortical and subcortical currents of activation 
during purchasing decision tasks through the use of neuroimaging techniques (Kenning & 
Plassmann, 2005).  Deppe, Schwindt, Kugel, Plassman, and Kenning (2005) were able to 
determine through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) when an individual 
was making a purchase involving a favorite, or more valued, tangible consumer good.  
The predictability of purchase preference based on brain imaging was quite high as the 
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neural pathways were very distinct in origin.  In addition, the preferred consumer good 
was found to increase activation in areas related strongly to affect and emotion leading 
the team to suggest that emotional ties to consumer products and purchases create 
stronger preferences that drive repeat behaviors (Deppe, Schwindt, Kugel, Plassman, & 
Kenning, 2005; Sharot, Mauricio, Phelps, & Elizabeth, 2004).  Additional studies using 
positron emission tomography (PET) have indicated that emotional responses from the 
amygdala in the medial temporal lobe correlates with individual subjective ratings of 
consumer items which, in turn, correlates to incentive value and activation of the lateral 
orbitofrontal regions of the brain (Braeutigam, 2005).  These networks tie together the 
processes of affect and preferences, and incentives and decision making, creating the 
justification for affective inclusion in the decision making process and the decision 
process creating its own affective response that will affect future decision making 
actions. 
  Another strong case for emotion as relevant to value can be found in the work of 
Desmeules, Bechara, and Dube (2008) in approach and avoidance systems of motivation 
and decision choice.  In multiple studies, the researchers have found that approach and 
avoidance regulating systems, identified primarily as affective systems that selectively 
recruit cognitive resources, create systematic preferences that lead to stable and repeated 
behaviors. 
Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, and Cohen (2006) advocate a strong relationship 
between the affective creation of preference and value and the biological influence of 
reward.  In animal models, electrical chemical recordings along specific neural pathways 
have shown that certain interior portions of the brain respond differentially to reward 
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magnitude.  This has been repeated in brain imaging studies with humans in which choice 
items that have a greater affective value to the participant create greater brain activation 
in the reward circuits whether the choice items are monetary (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001), appetitive food items (McClure, Li, Tomlin, Cypert, & Montegue, 
2004), or intangible social situations (Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystom, & Cohen, 
2004). 
A review of the value literature allows for an expansion of the operationalized 
definition of value.  Though many researchers have used the term importance in 
empirical efforts as synonymous with value (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Sorensen, 
1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) there clearly exist other constructs and ideas which, 
bound together, create a structure for the construct of value.  These other elements allow 
the psychological construct of value to be conceptualized as a multi-dimensional 
affective construct with motivational properties.  Both the affective and motivational 
dimensions of affect play a role in yet another component of value:  stability. 
Stability 
 In line with the reasoning of value as containing both an incentive and attainment 
component (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), another element of the definition of stability is 
considered.  If value can serve to motivate behavior toward a particularly valued goal or 
state as considered by Atkinson (1957), Rosenberg (1960), and Shah and Higgins (1997), 
and value can also reinforce a behavior after reaching or attaining that goal as determined 
by Heckhausen (1991), Eccles and Wigfield (2000), and Nagengast, Marsh, and Scalas 
(2011), then the expectation should be that the behavior and value stimulus should 
become learned and perhaps stable relationships.  As previously stated, the work of 
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Gottfied, O’Doherty, and Dolan (2003) touch directly on the issue of reinforcement and 
predictive value of behavior as represented in specific brain structures and networks.  
This belief is further supported by the work of Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, 
and Behrens (2011) in their recent review of reward guided learning and reinforcement in 
decision making.  The idea of learning and reinforcement from value is also a component 
of the cognitive processing literature as exemplified by Bruner and Goodman’s (1947) 
research on unconscious processing and the more recent biological elements of 
perceptual processing of value as given by Dolan (2002) and LeBar & Cabeza (2006).  
This ultimately presents the possibility that a previously unstated component may exist in 
the definition of value:  stability.  
Stability is the recognition that affective valuations of stimuli are learned and are 
often assimilated implicitly (Murray, Izquierdo, & Malkova, 2009; Phelps & LeDoux, 
2005; Scherer & Ellsworth, 2009; Storbeck & Clore, 2008; Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 
2009).  Stability represents a very specific dimension of cognitive interaction:  
specifically, affective memory.  To understand the role affect may play in the memory of 
experienced stimuli, and the effect this would have on the concept of stability, one must 
turn to the amygdala, a small, bilateral structure in the medial temporal lobe just forward 
of the anterior portion of the hippocampus (Freese & Amaral, 2009).  Numerous studies 
indicate that the amygdala is involved in the determination of valence and arousal for 
experienced and novel stimuli, or at least, is involved in determining the salience of the 
stimuli to the organism with which it is interacting (Cunningham, Bavel, & Johnsen, 
2008; Dalgleish, 2004; Freese & Amaral, 2009; LaBar & Cabezza, 2006; LeDoux & 
Schiller, 2009).  Whether discussing affective style (Davidson, 2004), neural decision 
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theory (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008), an affect oriented event-coding account of 
action (Lavender & Hommel, 2007), appraisal theories of affect and cognition (Scherer & 
Ellsworth, 2009) or the primacy of feelings in judgment (Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & 
Hughes, 2001), one element is quite clear:  there is a specific neural link between 
affective stimuli as registered in the amygdala and a positive impact on implicit memory 
retention.  The amygdala does not act alone in the enhancement of memory, but is shown 
to marshall cortical areas of the prefrontal cortex related to attention to promote 
continued focus on the stimuli in question, and to stimulate hippocampal regions for the 
actual encoding of the memory for later retrieval (Davidson, 2004; Isen, 2001; Kensinger 
& Schacter, 2008; LaBar & Warren, 2009; Sander, 2009). 
 This is not to suggest that once an individual has experienced a particular stimulus 
and affective response pairing numerous times that the pairing would stay inviolate for 
the lifespan of the organism.  Plasticity, or the ability of neural connections to alter and 
change based on past and current experience, is an important condition to any category of 
memory (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Whalen, Davis, Oler, Kim, Kim, & Neta, 
2009).  The ability to change and alter the neural connections that represent a particular 
stimulus is critical to the adaptive process, both affectively and cognitively (Allen & 
Monyer, 2013; Cunningham, Bavel, Johnsen, 2008; Gaesser, Sorengm NcKekkabdm 
Addusm & Sschacter, 2013; Hamann, 2009; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
 Therefore, the concept of stability in the definition of value represents an affective 
memory trace for a particular stimulus that will cause an organism, barring cognitive or 
affective interference, to remember the felt expression of the stimuli and to regard it 
similarly through multiple experiences.  This allows for the growth of the organism as 
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new experiences, and experiences with novel stimuli, may change the relative affective 
expression for a previous stimulus.  The not always consciously remembered state and 
felt expression is then believed to influence individual action (Cunningham & Zelazo, 
2007). 
Regret 
 One construct with a strong theoretical base and significant experimental support 
data is regret.  Since regret is an affective construct related to decision and choice 
processes, it should prove to be a reasonable companion construct for the validity 
process.  Previous research (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, 
& van der Pligt, 2000; Roese & Summerville, 2005) has identified particular 
characteristics of the construct of regret and are elucidated below.  Described in the 
following sections are counterfactuals, the idea of anticipatory regret, issues of personal 
agency, opportunity for action, and a differentiation between disappointment and regret.  
Additionally, the issue of regret having the ability to inform or alter behavior will be 
briefly discussed as an important element within each of the above mentioned 
characteristics of regret (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005). 
 Counterfactuals.  As uncertainty is one of the most common conditions under 
which an individual makes a decision, it is not surprising that one emotion of particular 
interest is regret.  When an individual makes a decision, he or she may have particular 
emotions associated with the type of decision to be made (getting married, buying a 
house, selecting a retirement savings plan, etc.) and form expectations as to the outcome, 
and the emotions associated with the outcome, of the decision process (Connolly & 
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Zeelenberg, 2002).  Regret is directly tied to the expectations of the decision.  More 
specifically, regret is the cognitively based negative emotion associated with a decision 
of poor outcome that might have turned out differently with a different choice made 
(Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004).  The cognitive creation of multiple 
alternatives in a decision situation and the attempted evaluation of those alternative has 
been termed counterfactual thinking – first identified by Kahneman and Tversky in 1982 
(Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000).   
      The concept of counterfactual thinking is integral to the research on regret.  
Counterfactuals contain all the elements necessary to identify and research the overall 
decision process, including the motivation to act according to what an individual most 
desires or values.  Counterfactuals contain antecedent conditions and multiple alternative 
outcomes that can give rise to the cognitive processes necessary to reach each of the 
alternative goal states and therefore give rise to the behavioral process that is actually 
used to reach an identified goal state (Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 
2000).  Using counterfactual thought as a basis for the regret definition, Brehaut, 
O’Connor, Wood, Hack, Siminoff, Gordon, and Feldman-Stewart (2003) attempted to 
create a decision regret scale for medical decisions by patients.  After factor analysis and 
test-retest reliability efforts, internal consistency was positive, with mean scores and 
correlations consistent across items. 
In simpler terms, the idea of counterfactual thought is that an individual will, after 
making a decision, elaborate on each of the possible outcomes that might have happened 
if a different choice had been made.  Are these outcomes real?  No, they are fictions.  
When an individual makes a decision, he or she is often not aware of the outcome.  Nor is 
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the individual aware of alternative outcomes.  The perceived outcomes of choices not 
made are based solely on guesses and inferences based on one’s knowledge of the world 
and the circumstances surrounding a particular choice condition (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van 
der Plight, & DeVries, 1996).  The antecedent conditions as well as the alternative goal 
states assist regret researchers as the anticipated negative affective outcomes and their 
appraisals can be assessed, albeit through self report, and the actual affective response 
can be assessed after the choice is made (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).   
 Anticipatory Regret.  When an individual decides between multiple options, the 
regret associated with each option is included into the decision making process (Hetts, 
Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000).  This type of regret, anticipatory regret, 
is part of the cognitive counterfactual thought process and is believed to moderate the 
intention-behavior relationship (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003).  As part of the antecedent 
process to the actual decision, the potential for anticipated regret to alter the choice 
behavior is particularly interesting.  By thinking about how the outcome of a decision 
will make someone feel, the individual is gauging the utility of that prospect through an 
emotional lens.  Since individuals have a general tendency to wish to avoid negative 
affect, the planning stage of the decision process, or the intention to act on a particular 
choice facing that individual, will be affected by the prospect of the anticipated regret 
associated with a particular course of action (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003).  The empirical 
results of this were made manifest in three studies performed by Abraham & Sheeran 
(2003).  The studies used linear regression modeling and the following variables in three 
different scenarios:  actual exercise behavior, planned exercise behavior, past exercise 
behavior, and anticipated regret for not exercising.  The first study simply found that each 
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variable added to the model improved variance accounted for with anticipated regret 
providing minimal variance but the intention by anticipated regret variable accounted for 
a significant effect of variance.  Similar results were found in both the second and third 
studies with the second priming anticipated regret through a pre-questionnaire question 
and the third accounting for the intention and anticipated regret interaction having a 
stability effect on actual behavior. 
Interesting additions to this theory revolve around whether or not individuals 
spontaneously generate anticipated regret (Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 
2002).  If anticipated regret is not spontaneously generated, but requires cues or questions 
to be activated prior to the decision, then the lack or existence of the anticipated regret 
should change the intensity of the regret felt for a poor decision (Crawford, McConnell, 
Lewis, & Sherman, 2002). 
 Personal Agency.  A key component found to be essential in the expression of 
regret is that of personal agency and the sense that the individual had control over the 
situation and made a bad choice (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000).  
Regret, therefore, is accompanied by feelings that the individual has lost an opportunity 
and desire to correct one’s mistake, by wanting to completely undo the situation, and a 
wish that the situation could be “done over” to produce a more valued outcome (Pieters 
& Zeelenberg, 2005).  This is one of the most consistently found results in regret research 
and has been found in a variety of experimental contexts (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & 
Wilson, 2004; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  There have 
been two moderating effects identified for personal agency that may have exceptional 
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impact on the intensity of the regret after choice:  the action/inaction effect and 
reactance/compliance effect. 
 The action/inaction effect is directly related to the individual’s opportunity to act 
or not act in a particular decision or choice situation (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005).  The 
original belief was that regret is intensified in situations where an individual has the 
opportunity to act but chooses not to act and therefore misses out on a desirable outcome 
(Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005; Ordonez & Connolly, 2000).  However, recent research has 
shown that it is not simply the action or inaction that influences the regret intensity, but 
whether the action or inaction is both “normal” behavior for the situation and justifiable 
under the conditions of the decisions.  Therefore, under the constraints of agency and 
action, regret intensity will be increased when one’s decision is unreasonable, 
unjustifiable, and inexplicable (Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). 
 The reactance/compliance effect is tied to both personal agency and the 
action/inaction effect.  According to reactance theory, there exists a set of free behaviors 
from which an individual can choose.  If any of these behaviors are restricted, eliminated, 
or simply threatened, a motivational state called reactance is activated to reestablish this 
restricted behavior (Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 2002).  In the theories of 
regret, this is best illustrated when an individual is facing a decision and there is influence 
from another individual to pick a particular course of action.  This influence can result in 
reactance in which the individual actively chooses against the advice given, or 
compliance where the individual follows the advice and chooses the recommended 
course of action (Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 2002).  Experimental results 
indicate that awareness and feelings of anticipated regret lead to higher levels of 
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compliance and that compliance leads to greater actual regret than does reactance 
(Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 2002).  This offers the intriguing possibility 
that behavior can be altered and changed based on the previous experience that an 
individual has with the influence of individuals in very particular decision and choice 
circumstances. 
 Opportunity.  Opportunity could be considered as being in line, and a part of, the 
action/inaction effect, but there are particular elements that are best discussed on their 
own.  In the simplest terms, opportunity is believed to breed regret (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005).  It is clear to see how the concept of opportunity and the 
action/inaction effect are related.  One cannot act if one does not have the opportunity to 
act or have the opportunity to not act.  From this viewpoint, opportunity is a precursor 
and prerequisite for the action/inaction effect. 
The opportunity principle states that regret will be strongest where the chances for 
corrective action are the clearest (Roese & Summerville, 2005).  The second principle of 
opportunity is that regret spurs corrective action in the decision process and that the 
corrective action is more likely when the action is both possible and effective (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005).  These principles involved with the opportunity for corrective action 
and the motivation to change the decision process have strong implications for any 
experimental condition in which participants are given the option of changing a choice 
selection, or in which the participant will be involved in multiple trials that allow for one 
to learn from the regret of a previous trial.  A simple experiment by Gilbert, Morewedge, 
Risen, and Wilson (2004) illustrates this principle.  Experimenters spent time in a subway 
station.  When people arrived at the station after a train had left, the experimenters would 
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interview the individuals and give them unknown information such as the train left 1 
minute ago, narrow margin condition, to the train left 5 minutes ago, wider margin 
condition.  Individuals agreeing to participate then answered questions regarding regret 
over having missed the train.  Participants in the narrow margin condition who missed the 
train by 1 minute related higher levels of regret simply because the possibility of 
corrective action was viewed as higher.  Participants felt that leaving home only a few 
seconds earlier, not stopping for coffee, or even walking a bit faster were all controllable, 
agency, based options for not having missed the train. 
  Opportunity also seems to be a principle component in the regret individuals feel 
in different life domains that equate to the value individuals hold for those domains.  In a 
meta-analysis that reviewed previously published regret rankings, Roese and 
Summerville (2005) found that an individual’s biggest regrets in life are those with the 
biggest chance of corrective action.  Additionally, opportunity and importance, or value, 
were the most significant independent predictors of regret intensity in a regression model.  
In their meta-analysis, Roese and Summerville (2005) were able to identify six high 
opportunity life domains and six low opportunity life domains.  The regret associated 
with questions from each domain was significantly higher in the high opportunity 
domains and those high opportunity domains were found to be the ones more personally 
important to the participants (Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
 Disappointment.  Before continuing, it is necessary to allay a common 
misconception when dealing with research in this area.  There have been questions raised 
as to the differences between the constructs of regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg, 
van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000).  Both regret and disappointment are 
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associated with decision processes.  How then are they to be reliably differentiated?  
Appraisal theory is one method that can be used to differentiate emotions as “each 
emotion can be related to specific patterns of evaluations and interpretations of events 
(appraisals)”(van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002, p. 322).  It has been found that, using the 
appraisal dimensions as proposed by Roseman (1996), regret and disappointment are very 
clearly delineated in the outcome of a decision (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  Using 
autobiographical recall procedures and imagined scenarios in different research studies, 
Martinez, Zeelenberg, and Rijsman (2010) were able to clearly differentiate the affective 
states of regret and disappointment.  In addition, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, and 
van der Plight (2000) found distinct antecedent conditions and appraisal patterns for 
disappointment and regret through personal interviews and recall of past participant 
experiences. 
As stated earlier, personal agency and a feeling of control are important elements 
to the expression of the regret emotion.  This was clearly demonstrated in the 
experimental results of van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002) where regret was associated with 
the control and agency appraisals while the emotion of disappointment was identified 
with the appraisals of unexpectedness, desirability of a pleasurable outcome, and 
circumstances beyond one’s control.  In a similar study, Zeelenberg et al. (2000) found 
that regret was more intensely felt than disappointment and operated through self-
recrimination over the bad choice and the desire to undo the circumstances or to get a 
second chance.  Disappointment on the other hand, involved the feeling of powerlessness 
and the desire to turn away or get away from the situation.  Though both are considered 
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to be emotions and both are expected to be experienced from the outcome of a bad 
decision, it is clear that they are not experienced under the same decision conditions. 
Scope of Research on Regret  
 Regret has been extensively studied empirically in numerous fields of research 
such as mental health (Roese, Epstude, & Fessel, 2009; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 
2008;) personal relationships (Roese, 2006; Summerville & Buchanan, 2013) economics 
and monetary decision processes (van de Venn & Zeelenberg, 2011;  Thiene, Boeri, & 
Chorus, 2012) judgment and decision making (Zeelenberg, 1998; Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002) and the study of the relationship of value to disappointment (van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011).   
Even with such variety of study, what is truly laudable is that the definition for 
regret remains essentially the same throughout:  regret is the negative affective state 
arising from the perceived belief that an alternative choice on the part of an individual 
would lead to a better, or more desired, outcome.  The combination of these two factors, 
extensive empirical research across multiple disciplines and the consistent definition used 
for empirical studies, provides for a strong construct with good construct validity 
(Trochim, 2006). 
 What has not been previously clearly articulated is the relationship of regret to 
value.  From the literature, it is clear that both value and regret have extensive empirical 
use in decision making, both monetary and dealing with intangible attitudes and 
appreciations, and motivation paradigms.  It is interesting that the two constructs, used in 
the same research areas, have not been used together in that research. 
	
	
45 
 A theoretical relationship, based on logic and awaiting empirical validation, can 
be seen in how the two constructs are used in the decision making and motivational 
research.  Value, from a motivational perspective, has its earliest conceptions as a drive 
for a particular goal or state (Atkinson, 1957).  Even later conceptions, such as incentive 
value from Heckhausen (1991) and task value from Expectancy - Value Theory (Wigfield 
& Eccles, 2000), recognize both drive for a goal and reinforcement of action for having 
reached that goal.  That which an individual desires or values, is worth acting toward or 
for.  Once achieved, a future situation in which that particular value is present will likely 
engage the previous behaviors that allowed the value to be achieved or attained. 
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Chapter 3 :  Methods 
 
The people, materials, and processes that are referenced in this chapter were 
organized and implemented to answer 3 questions.  First, does the construct of value have 
stability across time and across contexts of experience for an individual participant?  
Second, do the 3 categories of stimulus items used to elicit value ratings from the 
participants differ in their stability ratings across participants?  Third, is there a linear 
relationship between regret and perceived value as indicated in the previously 
hypothesized logic statement? 
Participants 
 Fifty-five students enrolled in an undergraduate educational psychology course at 
the University of South Carolina signed up to participate in the study for extra credit.  Of 
those 55, 11 either completed only one time period or did not fully complete one of the 
two time periods, leaving a total participant count of 44 (N=44, range = 19 years – 36 
years, Mage=21, 75% female).  Demographic data on the students who were not included 
in the study was incomplete and any attempt to determine specific sample differences 
between participants who did not complete the project and students who did complete the 
project was not attempted.  Based on self-report, the sample proved largely homogenous 
with a large number of European-Americans (N=38), and a small number of Black or 
African American respondents (N=4) and Asian respondents (N=2).   
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Materials   
      Seventy-two cards were created with textual descriptions and visual representations 
of various stimulus items with one stimulus item per card, see Figure 3.1 for example 
stimuli.  Each card had a unique number, presented to the participants as the Card 
Number, so that ratings for each stimulus item could be easily tracked.  Each stimulus 
item was created to fit into one of three categories:  monetary, tangible, and intangible 
items with twenty-four cards for each category.  The tangible and intangible card groups 
were created as representations of the broader domains of value and regret as exemplified 
by Schwartz (1996), Roese and Summerville (2007), and Rokeach (1973).  Each 
monetary card contained a dollar amount, none of which repeated, that ranged from 10 
dollars to 15,000 dollars.  Tangible items were physical items that an individual can buy 
and/or receive and expect to have over an extended period of time such as digital music 
players, trips, books, gaming systems, etc.  Experiential stimuli, the intangible items, 
were primarily experiences that are more difficult to quantify with a dollar value, but are 
still expected to have varying levels of value such as a family reunion, a beautiful sunset 
in a location of the participant’s choice, a period of time without pain or illness, etc.  The 
inclusion of monetary cards was based primarily on the fact that much of the regret and 
decision making research is based on experiments involving money (McClure, Laibson, 
Lowenstein, & Cohen, 2004; van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006; van Dijk, & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007).   See Appendix A for a list of card 
numbers and associated stimulus item descriptions. 
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Two surveys were used in this study, see Table 3.1 for a summary of the survey 
design and measures.  The first (Time One), collected demographic information for each 
participant, assigned a unique identifier not related to the participant’s name for use 
during the analysis procedures, and provided 72 entries for a card number; a value rating 
scale that ran from 1, indicating the item held no importance to the participant, to 10 
indicating that the item held great importance to the participant. 
 The second survey (Time Two), which was completed during a second session a 
minimum of 30 days later, contained 36 rounds of choice conditions.  Participants were 
required to select 1 card from 2 stacks of cards (the 72 stimulus items were randomly 
divided into 2 equal stacks or decks with equivalent numbers of items from each category 
in each deck).  They then rated (using a 10-point Likert-type scale) the value of the 
selected card, examined the non-selected card and rated the value of that card and finally 
rated how much regret they had for choosing the selected card over the non-selected card. 
 
 
Sample Monetary Card Sample Tangible Card Sample Intangible Card 
   
 
Figure 3.1.  Example Stimuli Cards 
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Procedure 
 As previously stated, the study consisted of 2 phases that were separated by a 
minimum of 30 days.  This amount of time was selected as it is maintained in this project 
that the value construct, as represented in human memory, is implicit in nature as 
opposed to explicit.  As a construct represented in implicit memory, the long-term storage 
of information related to value stimuli is not believed to have been actively memorized 
for retention (Bailey & Kandel, 2008), but has maintained its presence long-term through 
repeated exposure, with affective exposure enhancing the retention possibility (Alberini, 
2011; Brod, Werkle-Bergner, & Shing, 2013).  An issue of concern for a dual exposure 
procedure is memory priming (Kristjansson & Campana, 2010; Mace, 2005).  A 30 day 
delay would ensure any single exposure from Time One would not unduly influence the 
rating decisions in Time Two.  It was expected that the repeated exposure would create a 
priming effect, in essence, reestablishing the affective state from previous exposures 
allowing for a stable rating.  However, there was not expected to be an accurate 
declarative memory of the actual number of the rating from Time One without explicit 
repetition (Alberini, 2011; Brod, Werkle-Bergner, & Shing, 2013; Dalgleish, 2004). 
 Time One involved the use of the 72 stimulus item cards, shuffled randomly and 
kept in 1 deck face down, and Survey I.  Participants signed up for hour long blocks of 
Table 3.1 Survey Design, Measures and Scale.  
Time Measures Scale 
Time One Value Rating 1 = No Importance to 10 = High 
Importance  
Time Two Selected Card Value Rating 1 = No Importance to 10 = High 
Importance 
Non-Selected Card Value Rating 1 = No Importance to 10 = High 
Importance 
Regret at Selection Choice Rating  1 = No Regret to 10 = High Regret 
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time.  Upon arrival at the designated location for the study, participants were given 
Survey I and asked to fill out the demographic information on the first page.  When 
finished, the proctor then gave the instructions for the rest of the survey.  Participants 
were instructed to turn over the top card of the stimulus item deck, read the description 
and look at the accompanying image, write the Card Number down in the space provided 
on Survey I, and then rate how important that item was to them on a scale from 1 to 10 
with 1 being not important and 10 being very important.  Participants were told to 
continue following that procedure until all cards in the deck had been rated.  Before being 
allowed to begin, participants were asked to keep three rules in mind and a sign was 
placed on the desk with the rules clearly printed to help the participant to remember them.   
1. Rule one:  all ratings are for how important the item is to you personally.  Do not 
consider the perceived importance by friends, loved ones, family, etc.   
2. Rule two:  imagine that you do not own the item on the card, or if an experience, 
have access to the experience.  Then consider how important the item is to you.   
3. Rule three:  do not consider how much money the item or experience would cost 
you.  Just consider how important the item or experience would be for you to have 
given rule one and rule two.   
The proctor would then leave the room to remove distractions and potential bias from the 
rating procedure.  Participants were told to open the door and ask the proctor for 
assistance if there were any questions.  When complete, the participant left the room and 
the proctor took the survey to file it accordingly. 
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 At Time Two, participants completed Survey Two, using the 72 stimulus item 
cards divided into 2 stacks with an equal number of monetary, tangible, and intangible 
items in each stack.  Items within each stack were randomized for each participant. 
 The participants were given Survey Two and reminded that the 3 rules to 
remember during the rating of stimulus items in Time I still apply to Time Two stimulus 
ratings.  Participants were asked to pick the top card from either stack of stimulus cards, 
designated as stack A and stack B, and turn it face up on the desk in front of the stack that 
it came from.  This, they were told, was their selection and should be considered a 
hypothetical gift.  They then were to write the card number in the space provided and to 
rate the importance of the item or experience on the same ten-point scale as used in Time 
One.  Then, the participants were asked to turn over the top card from the stack from 
which their selection did not come and lay it face up on the desk in front of its origin 
stack.  This, they were reminded, was the card that they could have selected.  The 
participants wrote down the card number for this stimulus item and rated it on the same 1 
to 10 importance scale as used in Time One.  Participants were then asked to rate how 
much they regret having selected their hypothetical gift versus the gift they could have 
selected but did not.  The regret scale was a 10 point scale with 1 representing no regret 
and 10 representing high regret.  This completed one round of the Time Two survey.  
With 36 cards in each stack, the participants were asked to continue the process for 
another 35 rounds until all cards had been rated.  Again, once participants had completed 
one round, the proctor left the room to ensure privacy of responses.  Participants were 
told to open the door and get the proctor should they have any questions.  Table 3.2 
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illustrates the application of the hypothesis logic statement on a hypothetical participant’s 
responses over three rounds of selections. 
Figure 3.2 provides a breakdown of the items used, how they were organized, and 
how the participants used those items in the Time One and Time Two procedures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Example of Participant Selection of Cards, Value Ratings, and Adherence to 
Hypothesized Pattern Over Three Rounds 
 
   Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Perceived Value Rating for 1st Card Selected 
(Logic Notation S for Selected) 
8 3 8 
Perceived Value Rating for 2nd Card Selected 
(Logic Notation NS for Not Selected) 
5 6 5 
Perceived Regret Rating for Comparison (Logic 
Notation R for Regret) 
3 9 7 
Hypothesized Regret Number Based on 1st and 
2nd Card Selection 
≤ 5 ≥ 6 ≤ 5 
Follows Hypothesis Yes Yes No 
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Time One Item Item Item Method  
 24 Monetary 
Cards 
101-124 
24 Tangible 
Cards 
201-224 
24 Intangible 
Cards 
301-324 
Monetary, 
Tangible, and 
Intangible 
cards 
randomized 
into one 
stack of 72 
cards for 
value rating 
on 10 point 
scale 
 
 
    
 
Time Two Item Item Method 
Step 1 
Method 
Step 2 
Method 
Step 3 
 12 Monetary, 
12 Tangible, 
and 12 
Intangible 
cards 
randomly 
selected for 
Deck A and 
shuffled 
12 Monetary, 
12 Tangible, 
and 12 
Intangible 
cards 
randomly 
selected for 
Deck B and 
shuffled 
Turn over top 
card from 
deck A or B 
as your 
selection.  
Give value 
rating for 
item on card 
on 10 point 
scale. 
Turn over top 
card from 
deck not 
selected in 
Step 1.  Give 
value rating 
for item on 
card on 10 
point scale. 
Imagining that 
you received 
the item on 
card from 
Step 1, rate 
regret on 10 
point scale of 
having item 
from  Step 1 
instead of 
item from 
Step 2 
 
  
      
 
Figure 3.2.  Summary of Materials and Processes for Time One and Time Two 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
 Three research questions were asked related to within subject stability of value 
across contexts, the stability of value ratings across subjects in different domains of 
interest, and the relationship between perceived value and perceived regret.  Within-
subject stability was measured through the rating of the same stimulus items by the 
participant at two different time points and under two different conditions.  A paired 
samples t-test was the primary assessment measure used.  Absolute value difference 
scores were then created for each participant.  The difference scores for all participants 
were averaged for the monetary stimulus item category, the tangible stimulus item 
category, and the intangible stimulus item category.  Paired sample t-tests were run for 
each pairing of stimulus item category:  monetary and tangible, monetary and intangible, 
and tangible and intangible.  The relationship between perceived regret and perceived 
value in a choice condition was hypothesized to follow a particular pattern.   Based on the 
choices and ratings made by the participants, each instance of a choice following the 
expected pattern was considered true and each instance that did not follow the pattern 
was considered false.  This allowed for a binomial distribution comparison of number of 
responses compared to number of responses listed as true to determine if a statistically 
significant number of responses were found to be true.  Then, the participants could be 
compared to a binomial distribution for number of participants found to be statistically 
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significant out of the total number of participants.  The results of these investigations are 
presented in this same order. 
Hypothesis 1 Result:  Within Subject Stability 
 A 72 item repeated measures t-test was used to determine if the ratings made by a 
participant at Time One were statistically similar to the ratings given at Time Two across 
all items.  Therefore, 44 t-tests were run, one for each participant of the study.  Of the 44 
tests run, 16 showed a mean difference in scores between Time One and Time Two 
(N=16).  However, interpretation of the results must be considered carefully.  As the 
hypothesis states that importance ratings will not vary between phases, the tests that were 
not statistically significant for a t-test are the scores of interest (N=28).  The 44 scores, 
their significance values, and their confidence intervals are listed in Appendix B. 
 The 44 t-tests were then subjected to a one-sided binomial test, given the one-
sided hypothesis, to determine if the number of participants who demonstrated stability in 
scores was statistically significant given the sample size.  Based on the results of the 
binomial test, the 28 scores of interest were determined to be a statistically significant 
number of scores given the sample size (p < .048, CV = 28). 
Of the 44 participants in the study, 28 showed no statistical difference in ratings 
from Time One to Time Two.  When compared to a binomial distribution with a 
maximum number of 44, the 28 participants were found to be a statistically significant 
number of participants who were stable in their rating of value. 
Hypothesis 2 Result:  Across Category Stability 
An additional analysis was run to determine if there was a difference in level of 
stability rating between the three categories of stimulus items:  monetary, tangible, and 
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intangible.  Were the ratings of the participants as a group more stable for a particular 
group of stimulus items or were the ratings by group statistically different?  To determine 
this, an absolute value difference score was created for each Time One and Time Two 
rating of each stimulus item for each participant.  As the ratings were on a scale of 1 to 10 
for all pairings and there was no a priori hypothesis as to whether a particular rating 
would be higher than another, the absolute value of change was the number of interest.  
Once the difference scores were created, the difference scores for each paired item were 
averaged across participants.  This provided 24 difference scores for the monetary 
category, 24 difference scores for the tangible category, and 24 difference scores for the 
intangible category.  These scores were then subjected to a paired samples t-test:  
Monetary category (M = .62, SD = .27) paired with Tangible category (M = 1.93, SD = 
.67), Monetary category (M = .62, SD = .27) paired with Intangible category (M = 1.64, 
SD = .60), and Tangible category (M = 1.93, SD = .67) paired with Intangible category 
(M = 1.64, SD = .60).  The results of the absolute value difference scores t-test pairings 
are given in Table 4.1. 
 Three paired samples t-test were conducted on the absolute value difference 
scores of the participants grouped by stimulus item category to determine if the stability 
of participant ratings was similar across those categories.  The Monetary and Tangible 
categories showed clearly that there was indeed a difference in the stability of ratings as 
represented by difference scores, t(43) = 11.09, p < 0.001.  The effect size for the 
Monetary and Tangible pairing was found to exceed Cohen’s (1988) convention for a 
large effect (d = 2.36).  Similarly, the Monetary and Intangible category pairing showed a 
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statistically significant difference in stability as represented in difference scores, t(43) = 
10.09, p < 0.001.  The effect size for the Monetary and Intangible pairing also exceeded 
Cohen’s (1988) convention for a large effect (d = 2.15).  The Tangible and Intangible 
pairing of difference scores also display a statistically significant difference in stability, 
t(43) = 2.08, p = .043.  In this instance, the effect size for Cohen’s (1988) convention can 
best be characterized as a medium effect (d = .44). 
Hypothesis 3 Result:  Relation Between Value and Regret 
 The third research question and process involves the hypothesized relation of 
value and regret.  Time Two of the study involved 36 choice conditions for each 
participant as stipulated in the procedures section.  Each choice condition for each 
participant, minus any choices in which the value ratings for “S” (selected) and “NS” (not 
selected) were the same, was subjected to the following logic condition to determine 
whether it was true: (⇒ S > NS ∧ R ≤ NS) ∨ (⇒ S < NS ∧ R ≥ NS). 
In other words, if the participant selected a card and the value rating for that card 
was above the value rating of the not selected card, the perceived regret would be lower 
than both the selected and not selected ratings on the same scale.  In addition, if the 
participant rated the value of the selected card as below the value rating of the not 
selected card, the perceived regret rating, on the same scale, would be higher than both 
Table 4.1 Pairings of Stimulus Item Categories and Significance 
Category 1 Category 2 t(df) p Cohen’s d 
Monetary Tangible t(43) = 11.09 p < 0.001 d = 2.36 
Monetary Intangible t(43) = 10.09 p < 0.001 d = 2.15 
Tangible Intangible t(43) = 2.08 p = .043 d = .44 
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the selected and not selected value ratings.  If either of these conditions was met, the 
hypothesis was deemed to be true.  
Once each of the choice conditions was determined as true or false, the observed 
number of true responses was compared to a binomial test for the total number of 
responses from that participant.  In order to accomplish this task, as each participant 
could potentially have a different number of responses once the ties were removed from 
consideration, a binomial table was created for responses ranging from a count of 15 to 
36 total choice conditions.  Confidence intervals were also calculated to help interpret the 
true significance of the procedure for each participant as the total number of responses 
varied and the samples size for each participant was not particularly large.  The results 
from this procedure are outlined in Appendix B. 
 After this initial procedure, the total number of participants who had a statistically 
significant number of choice condition responses out of their total number of responses 
was again compared to a binomial table.  The critical value for the 44 participants was 28 
with an observed number of statistically significant participants equaling 39.  This result 
indicates a statistically significant proportion of the participants fell within the 
hypothesized relationship between value and regret (p = .048, CV=28).  This relationship 
indicates that as value for a personal selection increases compared to an alternative 
selection, the regret of the selection choice decreases.  Similarly, if the value of a 
personal selection is lower than the perceived value of the unselected choice, the regret 
for the personal decision increases
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 
This chapter will briefly review the research questions addressed in the study and 
the accompanying results.  The limitations in the study are presented so the results are 
placed in proper context.  Implications for research and practice will be reviewed before 
closing remarks. 
Overview of this Research 
 The primary purpose of this research was the clarification of qualities of the 
psychological construct of value.  Three research questions were asked related to within 
subject stability of value across contexts, the stability of value ratings across subjects in 
different domains of interest, and the relationship between perceived value and perceived 
regret. 
Within subject stability for hypothesis one was measured through the rating of the 
same stimulus items by the participant at two different time points and under two 
different conditions.  A paired samples t-test was the primary assessment measure used 
and indicated that any difference in ratings from Time One to Time Two could not be 
statistically attributed to chance. 
To determine if there was a difference in stability ratings between the different 
categories of stimulus items presented, absolute value difference scores were created for 
each participant.  The difference scores for all participants were averaged for the 
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monetary stimulus item category, the tangible stimulus item category, and the intangible 
stimulus item category.  Paired sample t-tests were run for each pairing of stimulus item 
category:  monetary and tangible, monetary and intangible, and tangible and intangible.  
Statistically significant differences were discovered in all three pairings of stimulus item 
categories. 
The relationship between perceived regret and perceived value in a choice 
condition was hypothesized to follow a specified pattern.  Participants made value ratings 
during a choice condition that requested an additional regret rating.  Based on the choices 
and ratings made by the participants, each instance of a choice following the expected 
pattern was considered true and each instance that did not follow the pattern was 
considered false.  A binomial distribution comparison could then be made to consider if 
the number of responses found true out of all choice conditions was statistically 
significant for that participant.  After 44 binomial distribution comparisons, the 
participants could be compared to a binomial distribution for number of participants 
found to be statistically significant out of the total number of participants.  A statistically 
significant number of participants were found to follow the hypothesized pattern of value 
and regret ratings. 
Discussion of Results 
 The results of these three hypotheses suggest that there may be strong, stable, and 
predictable qualities related to the construct of value.  Hypothesis one involved the 
question of stability.  Though the literature base refers obliquely to the quality of stability 
in philosophy and culture (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), motivation (Atkinson, 1957, 
Rosenberg, 1960; Nagengast, et. al., 2011), and economic decision making (Doughtery, 
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Gettis, & Ogden, 1999; Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, 
& Cohen, 2006) it has not been the subject of direct empirical study.  These results 
indicate that 63.6% of participants (28 out of 44) showed stable value ratings on stimulus 
items from Time One to Time Two.  This could indicate that the affective properties of 
stimulus items help to create valence and arousal memory traces that are stored for use in 
future decision making. 
 It is important to note that no comparison was made on an individual level for 
how someone rated an item compared to someone else.  These ratings, and the stability 
results, are only personal and individual ratings and scores. 
 Hypothesis two raised the question of stability of value ratings between different 
domains.  The results of significant differences between the absolute value difference 
score ratings of the three domains of monetary (M = .62), intangible (M = 1.64), and 
tangible (M = 1.93) stimuli categories is not surprising and mirrors much of the work 
presented on preferences, value, and reward between money (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001), food items (McClure, Li, Tomlin, Cypert, & Montegue, 2004), and 
social situations (Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystom, & Cohen, 2004).  Preferences are 
believed to be affective and cognitive processes that fix specific valence and arousal 
patterns to specific items (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008).  Variances should be 
expected between stimuli.  The fact that the categories themselves showed such 
differences, and not just individual items, is not a finding in the existing research and 
opens another avenue for additional research in value domains. 
 This also serves as a cautionary note to future researchers.  There is no reason to 
believe that an individual who has somewhat similar ratings in one field or domain will 
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have similar ratings in another domain.  Domain specific research must be careful of 
genereralizations and multi-domain research in value must be aware of the potential 
differences across domains. 
 Hypotheis three investigated regret and value.  Regret and value, though both 
integral parts of the decision process, have not been studied together in any explicit 
manner previously.  The relationship between the two constructs is strong and predictable 
in this research with 88.6% of participants (39 out of 44) following the value and regret 
hypothesis.  This suggests the possibility of using these two constructs together in future 
research to improve understanding of the decision process.   
From a validity viewpoint, the greatest result presented is from hypothesis three.  
Regret is an incredibly stable construct that has been empirically studied in multiple 
domains using the same definition.  The hypothesized relationship between value and 
regret was strong.   
This process of measurement, using two constructs that are hypothetically linked 
in some way and determining if they are, indeed, related as hypothesized, is referred to as 
convergent validity (Trochim, 2006).  This is but one part of the construct validity 
process, but an important part from a research perspective.  Replication of these results 
will provide researchers with strong evidence of a solid relationship between the two 
constructs that can then be used in discriminant and content validity efforts (Slavin 2007, 
Trochim, 2006). 
Limitations 
 A number of limitations may impact the interpretation of these results.  Value, as 
a construct, is considered to be universal in that all nations and peoples on the planet have 
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the capacity for value generation for use in individual or cultural judgment situations 
(Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  Considering the population 
possibilities, the sample of 44 undergraduate participants from a particular university in 
the southeastern United States is not sufficient to make any generalizations.  
Additionally, the sample was very homogeneous in respect to cultural diversity. 
 In addition, the students who did not complete the procedures and were not 
included in the study may have impacted the results.  Listwise deletion, as a process, may 
potentially have an impact on statistical power.  There is also a lack of data on the 
students who did not complete the procedures leaving a question as to biases that may be 
inherent in the project that have gone unnoticed (Myers, 2011). 
 The within subject question of stability suffers from a number of methodological 
issues.  Considering the need to address how an individual would rate the importance of 
an item multiple times, the balance between multiple ratings and the concern of a 
participant remembering a previous rating of a particular stimulus was delicate.  A third 
rating of the same stimulus items may well have better served the question of stability, 
however, what time delay would be appropriate to ensure no previous memory of the 
ratings applied to the third round of stimulus ratings?  One solution would be to maintain 
the 30 day delay in hopes that no memory consolidation of the previous experience was 
possible.  It is also possible that a priming test of items similar to, but not exact repeats 
of, the target stimulus items may have interfered with memory consolidation.  Another 
option would be to wait a period of time designated by existing research to be sufficient 
in avoiding memory consolidation of the target stimulus items. 
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 Another empirical issue relates to the stimulus items used in all three research 
questions.  The stimulus items were specifically selected to be representative of objects, 
situations, and scenarios that would prove common, or at least familiar, to the 
participants.  This may well have produced a cultural bias in the representative stimulus 
items.  One method to validate or refute this concern would be to replicate the study with 
participants from multiple cultural backgrounds and compare mean and variance scores 
of the ratings.  This may provide insight into what cultural biases may exist for each 
monetary, tangible, and intangible item. 
 Finally, another issue regarding the stimulus items used involves the method of 
presentation.  As noted previously, images were either found or created for each stimulus 
item in the study and included on the cards along with explanatory text.  As perception 
may be affected by affective response, so may interpretation of visual stimuli.  As such, it 
is quite possible that the images used, particularly for the stimuli listed as intangible, 
made the item perceptually more tangible.  This, in turn, could affect the rating on the 
stimulus item.  With a sufficient number of subjects, a counter to this issue would be the 
division of the total sample into two equal groups both numerically and demographically.  
One group would go through all three procedures using stimulus cards as presented in 
this study.  The second group would use stimulus cards that had no images, only text 
descriptions.  Comparative analysis at the end of the study might then shed light on the 
potential impact the images may have provided. 
 One overarching and all-encompassing issue regards the very nature and 
definition of value.  As previously stated, there are multiple ways in which value has 
been studied in the social sciences.  Unfortunately, no common definition exists to guide 
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the individual and domain specific efforts toward a common goal of understanding.  This 
study suffers from the same symptoms as the only truly definitional aspect of value 
included was the idea of importance and stability.  The importance component was 
derived as synonymous for value use in previous studies.  The stability component was 
implied in previous research and empirically tested here. 
Implications for Future Research 
 Despite the positive experimental results and extensive literature, only the 
simplest of approximations for a definition of value was used in the research.  The reason 
is that there does not seem to be a consistent definition of value to guide further research 
into the construct.  If one were to study value only in the field of motivation, the 
definition most commonly used in that field could be used, but does that definition 
actually assist the construction of knowledge about the construct if another definition is 
operationalized in another field?  A common definition of value, applicable to and 
studied within, multiple fields and domains of study is needed. 
Without the common definition, and without established reference points from 
which to work, the majority of research in the realm of value tends to be from an 
empirical perspective that is severely limited in its generalizability to other uses of value 
as a construct.  As value has the potential to be vital to the understanding of human 
behavior, this issue needs to be addressed.  As Pham, et. al. (2001) state, “It is not a 
coincidence that the valuation of objects – whether products, issues, or people – has 
always been a major subject of inquiry in all social sciences.” (p. 167) 
This raises serious construct validity issues that would serve as an excellent 
starting point for further research on value.  This study is the first step towards a common 
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definition, however additional research in this area is necessary and must address the 
definition and origin of value as a construct. 
The beginning of the search for construct validity must begin with a definition.  
The importance of a strong, theoretically based, definition cannot be understated for 
ultimately, the measure created to gauge the construct will be based upon what the 
construct is believed to represent (Slavin, 2007; Smith, 2005; Strauss & Smith, 2009). 
The definition of the construct, therefore, informs how the construct interacts with other 
constructs or processes and helps to define the measures that will be used to help 
determine its existence. 
Trochim (2006) uses the phrase, “Inadequate Preoperational Explication of 
Constructs,” to help elucidate definitional issues.  In this, he states that, even before the 
construct has been placed into an operational conception, that is, before the researcher 
attempts to determine how the construct will actually interact with other constructs, 
processes, and individuals, one must be especially careful to fully conceptually define the 
construct.  Failure to do this is the first threat to construct validity. Whether the 
definitional process involves concept mapping, extensive research, or the assistance of 
other researchers in the field, the first step of construct validity must be a thorough 
investigation of the proposed construct (Trochim, 2006). 
It should be noted that the idea of construct validity subsumes the ideas of content 
validity, criterion-related validity, and other validity types related specifically to 
psychological constructs, is well established (Slavin, 2007; Smith, 2005; Strauss & 
Smith, 2009; Trochim, 2006; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003).   
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The issues with the construct of value, as illustrated by the research in different 
fields of study, point to one central idea:  the definition of a construct must be well 
formed if it is to meet the requirements of the researchers who use said construct.  The 
current evidence suggests that the construct of value has very little common ground for 
assessment and has no grounds for generalizability:  hence, no construct validity.  
Therefore, the creation of a definition must be undertaken with exceptional care and 
diligence. 
Based on the existing literature from across multiple disciplines that have used the 
construct of value as a variable in empirical studies, a definition for value that may serve 
as an opening effort into the true investigation of the construct follows:  value is an 
evolutionarily conserved biological process, affective in nature, that exhibits the 
properties of power, stability, and cognitive interaction.   
Justification for Future Research 
To justify future research into the definition of value, the components of the 
definition, how they tie into the existing literature, and how the current studies may 
contribute to their inclusion are discussed, beginning with a discussion of affect and 
suggesting that affect is biological.  Future research possibilities for an evolutionarily 
based origin of affect will link to existing literature and research studies. 
One definition of affect, provided by Frijda and Scherer (2009) in The 
Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences,  states, “The terms affect 
and the corresponding adjective affective are generally used in an overarching 
generic sense for a mental state that is characterized by emotion feeling as 
compared with rational thinking” (p. 10).  The definition continues to offer more 
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detail by elaborating with, “the term is often used in a general sense to refer to a 
class or category of mental states that includes emotions, moods, attitudes, 
interpersonal stances, and affect dispositions” (p. 10).  Another definition for affect 
provided by Zeelenberg, et. al. (2008) posits, “Affect is a generic term that refers 
to many experiential concepts including moods, emotions, attitudes, evaluations 
and preferences” and continues with, “Thus, any experiential concept that is 
positive or negative can be considered affective” (p. 19). 
Connected to affect, then, are personal representations of what is good or bad.  
Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) indicate that the term valence represents whether a 
stimulus is perceived as good or bad.  Pham, Cohen Pracejus, and Hughes (2001) state 
that arousal is directly related to the intensity of the valence a particular stimulus 
represents.  Together, valence and arousal create an appraisal process that determines 
whether an individual views a particular stimulus positively or negatively, and how 
positively or how negatively.  This conception is repeatedly supported throughout the 
affect literature.  In the affect-as-information literature, Storbeck and Clore (2008) are as 
clear as possible by stating that, “Affective experience is often treated as having two 
dimensions – valence and arousal” (p. 1862).  The terms arise again with Panksepp’s 
(2005) discussion of affective consciousness as the traditional views of affective mental 
representation.  Davidson (2003); Deak (2011); Desmeules, Bechara, and Dube (2007); 
Izard (2010); Litt, Eliasmith, and Thagard (2008); Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, and Lawrence 
(2003); Posner, et. al. (2009); and Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, and Pieters (2008) 
are all published researchers in the field of affect, or affective related issues, who use 
valence and arousal as core assumptions in their understanding.   
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Why should affect, or emotion, be included in the definition for value?  The 
central feature of the motivational and decision making research is that individuals will 
act in such a way as to maximize a valued goal or end state (Nagengast, Marsh, & Scalas, 
2011; Shah & Higgins, 1997).  The focus of achievement motivation research to 
“…explain people’s choice of achievement tasks, persistence on those tasks, vigor in 
carrying them out, and performance on them” (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) is directly tied 
to how desirable the end state of those tasks is viewed.  The level of desirability is the 
valence and arousal appraisal process that forms the core of the definition of affect.  
Therefore, affect, and the accompanying valence and arousal appraisals, should be 
considered an essential component for review in future empirical efforts with value. 
Is affect biological?  The literature has been somewhat inconsistent in exactly 
how affective states are made manifest in the brain so some review of what is meant by 
affective and biological together is mandated.  The problem is stated quite well by 
Panksepp (1998) with, “…there are presently no direct metrics by which we can 
unambiguously quantify changes in emotional states in any living creature” (p. 9).  This 
is further elaborated by Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, and Lawrence (2003) who state, 
“Although some preliminary work has begun to show that anger, too, may be linked to 
activity of a distinct neural system, regions considered critical for the recognition of 
happiness, sadness, or surprise have not yet been identified” (p. 209).  
This has not kept, however, research surrounding the idea that emotions have a 
specific biological basis from being attempted.  In fact, more recent evidence, as 
presented by Cunningham, Bavel, and Johnsen (2008), suggests that evidence from 
multiple methodologies converges on a particular structure in the brain necessary for the 
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processing of affective properties of stimuli:  the amygdala.  Future researchers should 
use neuroimaging techniques to track amygdala activation in relation to efferent and 
afferent connections to other brain areas:  particularly those areas related to judgment and 
decision making.  
 Despite the limitations presented for the stability element of the current research, 
some support is now provided overtly for the component of stability and value.  The 
definition for stability presented in this research includes information on how stability is 
manifest in value as its own component, how it relates to the affective qualities of value, 
and how it ties to the possible physical, biological, structures of the brain that may 
instantiate value. 
 In summary of the previous work, stability represents the learned expressions of 
affective stimuli the organism interacts with (Murray, Izquierdo, & Malkova, 2009; 
Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Scherer & Ellsworth, 2009; Storbeck & Clore, 2008; 
Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2009).  These expressions are recognized through the valence 
and arousal appraisals an individual makes when dealing with the environment (Scherer 
& Ellsworth, 2009) and how those appraisals become learned responses over repeated 
exposures (Davidson, 2004; Isen, 2008; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008; LaBar & Warren, 
2009; Sander, 2009).  In addition, these learned expressions are perceptually salient and 
tied to physical memory structures (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Whalen, Davis, 
Oler, Kim, Kim, & Neta, 2009).  The ability to change and alter the neural connections 
that represent a particular stimulus is critical to the adaptive process, both affectively and 
cognitively (Allen & Monyer, 2013; Cunningham, Bavel, Johnsen, 2008; Gaesser, 2013; 
Hamann, 2009; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
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 Future research should consider the stability factor, not as a lone variable, but as 
an interaction of affect, biology, and cognition.  Though the cognitive interaction 
component has been considered briefly, a more thorough account will improve future 
empirical efforts in incorporating all of the components. 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the affective process of value can, and 
will, interact with cognitive processes of evaluation and assessment as evidenced in the 
judgment and decision making literature (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2007; Thagard & Aubie, 2007), just as these examples of other affective 
processes are shown to have cognitive interaction. 
As value is considered to be an affective construct, how might cognitive 
interaction play a role by itself and in conjunction with the other definitional 
components?  The manner in which other affective processes and constructs have been 
shown to have cognitive interaction may help to illustrate the process.  The focus to this 
point has been on the amygdala as it has been found to serve the process of evaluating the 
valence and arousal of external stimuli (Cunningham, Bavel, & Johnson, 2008).  As 
stated before, it also has been shown to have extensive connections to both cortical and 
sub-cortical regions of the brain (Dalgleish, 2004; Fuster, 2008; LaBar & Cabezza, 2006). 
As affect has been implicated to have both conscious and non-conscious influence 
on memory and learning (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2009; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2008), judgment and decision making (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; 
Wagar & Thagard, 2004; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, 
Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), and motivation (Izard, 2007; Lavender & Hommel, 2007; 
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Panksepp, 2008), future research should investigate these phenomena as potentially 
critical to the value formation process. 
Conclusion 
 This research established the construct of value as an important element in the 
social sciences research on motivation and decision making in multiple contexts.  One 
implied component of the construct of value, but not explicitly stated or previously 
researched, was the possibility of stability of value across time and situations.  An 
associated construct in the decision making research, regret, was reviewed and 
theoretically linked to the construct of value. 
Three experimental hypotheses were asked related to within subject stability of 
value across contexts, the stability of value ratings across subjects in different domains of 
interest, and the relationship between perceived value and perceived regret. 
 These results and the research literature related to the constructs of value and 
regret suggest a great deal of future related research activities.  An expanded definition of 
value, derived from these results and existing literature, suggests that value is an 
evolutionarily conserved biological process, affective in nature, that exhibits the 
properties of power, stability, and cognitive interaction. 
 Continued research in this area that focuses on the elements of this definition will 
likely greatly improve the construct validity of value.  In turn, the improved construct 
validity, in addition to continued convergent validity data with the construct of regret, 
will improve the possibility of multi-domain convergence of research efforts regarding 
value.
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Appendix A 
 
Card Numbers and Associated Stimulus Item Descriptions 
 
101 $10.00 
102 $25.00 
103 $50.00 
104 $75.00 
105 $100.00 
106 $150.00 
107 $200.00 
108 $250.00 
109 $300.00 
110 $400.00 
111 $500.00 
112 $600.00 
113 $700.00 
114 $800.00 
115 $900.00 
116 $1,000.00 
117 $2,000.00 
118 $3,000.00 
119 $4,000.00 
120 $5,000.00 
121 $7,500.00 
122 $10,000.00 
123 $12,500.00 
124 $15,000.00 
201 A digital music player of choice 
202 An electric scooter 
203 A home theatre system 
204 An ebook reader 
205 2 movie tickets of choice 
206 A new laptop computer of choice 
207 20” flat screen computer monitor 
208 2 plane tickets to anywhere in the United States 
209 A new car of choice valued under $30,000 
210 A candy bar of choice 
211 1 furniture item of choice 
212 A handheld video game player 
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213 100 digital music downloads 
214 A hardback book of choice 
215 A touch screen pda / smartphone of choice 
216 1 kitchen appliance of choice 
217 A new bicycle of choice 
218 A new clothing outfit of choice 
219 2 plane tickets to any location world-wide 
220 A gourmet chocolate bar of choice 
221 1 item of sports equipment of choice 
222 A 40” flat screen HDTV 
223 A DVD / Blu Ray disc of choice 
224 An item of exercise equipment of choice 
301 Time alone with a beautiful sunset 
302 Dinner at home with family 
303 1 week without illness, injury, or pain 
304 A compliment from a friend 
305 Instantly learn a new language of choice 
306 Win 1st place in a competition 
307 Share a special place with a loved one or friend 
308 A personal religious / spiritual experience 
309 Donation to a charity of choice in your name 
310 An extra hour per day for one week 
311 A family reunion 
312 Dinner out with a loved one or friend 
313 A compliment from a relative 
314 A shared sunset with a loved one or friend 
315 1 year without injury, illness, or pain 
316 A free course or educational experience 
317 A reunion with best friend not seen in more than a year 
318 Instantly lose 10 pounds and keep them off 
319 10 hours of service donated to a charity of choice in your name 
320 1 month without illness, injury, or pain 
321 1 day with a loved one who has passed away 
322 A shared religious / spiritual experience 
323 Time alone in the woods or at a beach 
324 Extra time in your day for community service 
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Appendix B 
 
Participants, Total Responses, Recorded Scores, and Significance 
 
Participant Total 
responses 
minus ties 
Critical 
Value	
Recorded 
Score 
p Confidence 
interval 
(Normal 
approximation) 
3004 32 22 31 < .001 .97 ± .06 
3006 31 21 27 < .001 .87 ± .12 
3007 27 19 21 0.003 .78 ± .16 
3008 28 19 23 < .001 .82 ± .14 
3009 30 20 29 < .001 .97 ± .06 
3010 30 20 28 < .001 .93 ± .09 
3011 23 16 22 < .001 .96 ± .08 
3012 25 18 24 < .001 .96 ± .08 
3013 29 20 26 < .001 .90 ± .11 
3014 27 19 20 0.01 .74 ± .17 
3015 33 22 26 0.001 .79 ± .14 
3016 28 19 21 0.006 .75 ± .16 
3018 34 23 32 < .001 .94 ± .08 
3019 32 22 30 < .001 .94 ± .08 
3020 34 23 17 0.568 .50 ± .17 
3021 19 14 14 0.032 .74 ± .20 
3022 29 20 28 < .001 .97 ± .07 
3023 28 19 24 < .001 .86 ± .13 
3025 32 22 29 < .001 .91 ± .10 
3026 27 19 22 0.001 .81 ± .15 
	
	
90 
3028 31 21 27 < .001 .87 ± .12 
3029 30 20 21 0.021 .70 ± .16 
3030 33 22 26 0.001 .79 ± .14 
3031 29 20 22 0.004 .76 ± .16 
3032 33 22 31 < .001 .94 ± .08 
3033 33 22 33 < .001 1.0 ± 0 
3034 32 22 27 < .001 .84 ± .13 
3035 27 19 25 < .001 .93 ± .10 
3036 29 20 25 < .001 .86 ± .13 
3037 31 21 15 0.64 .48 ± .18 
3038 31 21 14 0.763 .45 ± .18 
3039 24 17 18 0.011 .75 ± .17 
3040 30 20 23 0.003 .77 ± .15 
3041 30 20 27 < .001 .90 ± .11 
3042 33 22 30 < .001 .91 ± .10 
3043 27 19 18 0.061 .67 ± .18 
3044 34 23 27 < .001 .79 ± .14 
3045 29 20 25 < .001 .86 ± .13 
3047 30 20 21 0.021 .70 ± .16 
3049 31 21 27 < .001 .87 ± .12 
3050 33 22 18 0.364 .55 ± .17 
3051 32 22 27 < .001 .84 ± .13 
3052 28 19 23 < .001 .82 ± .14 
3054 31 21 25 < .001 .81 ± .14 
 
